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INTESTATE SUCCESSION
INTESTATE SUCCESSION BY AND FROM
THE ADOPTED CHILD
FRED L. KUHLMANN t
The general function of the law is to enable individuals to
live together in society with minimum friction in their contacts
with each other. The job is one that is never finished. As
changes occur in the economic and social structure, new types
of factual situations arise and the law is continually confronted
with new challenges.
When the institution of adoption first appeared on the Ameri-
can scene, the usual family relationships were disturbed. For
the first time in a common-law country provision was made
whereby a parent-child and family status could be established
through a means other than natural birth. To the extent that
the common law was developed in contemplation of a family
relationship based upon blood-ties, adjustments had to be made
to recognize the innovations effected by adoption.
One of the implicit problems arising out of the situation was
that of altering the course of intestate succession to take into
account the creation of new and the severance of old ties of af-
fection as well as the changed economic relationship between the
adopted child and its natural and adoptive families.
Although many states attempted to meet the problem at an
early date, the status of adoption has changed as the years
passed and has affected the degree of transmutation of the
adopted child from the natural to the adoptive family. It is
therefore necessary to reexamine the existing rules of law gov-
erning intestate succession by and from the adopted child in
order to determine whether the law, in this limited sphere, is
performing its function in contemporary society.
THE FUNCTION OF ADOPTION
An intelligent appraisal of the intestate succession law and its
relationship to adoption is impossible unless the function of
adoption is understood and appreciated. It has a history dating
t LL.B., 1938, Washington University; LL.M., 1942, Columbia University.
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back to antiquity and was known to the Babylonians, Hebrews,
Egyptians and other early peoples.1 The Roman law recognized
adoption as a convenient method of providing a family heir to
save the family from extinction and to perpetuate the rights of
family religious worship. 2 Consequently, the early Roman law
provided for a complete substitution of the adoptive in lieu of
the natural relationship.3 It should be noted in passing that the
Romans used adoption as a device to promote the welfare of the
family as a unit rather than the welfare of the child or of the
society in general.
The provisions of the Roman law were accepted by other
civil-law countries despite changes in religious and social condi-
tions and the principal motive for adoption continued to be that
of heirship.4 In fact, the first legislation on the subject of adop-
tion in Texas5 and Alabama6 was patterned after the civil-law
provisions with heirship constituting the dominant purpose.
Adoption was not recognized by the English common law.'
Its use as an heirship device in England was probably precluded
by the nature of the English feudal system and the English
reverence for heirs of the blood of the ancestor. It is significant
that even when adoption was finally legalized in England by
Parliament in 1926, the Adoption Act made no provision for
any change in the common-law scheme of intestate succession.8
In view of our common-law heritage, it is therefore not sur-
prising to find no sign of adoption legislation in the United
States during the early years of our history. It is generally
recognized9 that the first adoption statute in this country was
1. One of the most complete accounts of the history of adoption has been
given by Judge Lamm in the oft-cited case of Hockaday v. Lynn (1906)
200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585.
2. Brosnan, The Law of Adoption (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 332.
3. At a later date, however, the Justinian Code changed the law to permit
the adoptee to retain his rights of succession in his natural family. The
Roman law of adoption is discussed in 2 Sherman, Roman Law in the
Modemn World (3d ed. 1937) 83 et seq.
4. Peck, Adoption Laws in the United States (1925) U. S. Dept. of
Labor, Children's Bur. Pub. No. 148, p. 1, fn. 2.
5. The first Texas legislation was established by an act of January 16.
1850. See Tex. Gen. Stat. Law (1859) 33.
6. See Ala. Code (1852) 385.
7. This fact is recited by innumerable cases and authorities. See, e. g.,
Peck, Domestic Relations (3d ed. 1930) 352; Madden, Persons and Domestio
Relations (1931) 354.
8. (1926) 16&17 Geo. V c. 29 §5 (2).
9. See, e. g., Knox, The Family and the Law (1941) 98, and Ricks, Legal
Aspects of Adoption (1937) 4. The Texas and Alabama acts of 1850, supra,
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passed by Massachusetts in 1851.10 The noteworthy fact, how-
ever, is not the date of the first enactment. The real significance
of the Massachusetts Act of 1851 lies in the fact that in content
and purpose it was entirely without precedent. Although there
is no statement of policy set forth in the statute, a perusal of
its provisions reveals a purpose to establish an institution to
ameliorate the condition of the neglected and dependent child. In-
heritance rights were only incidentally considered. For the first
time in the long history of adoption the interests of the child
became the primary concern of the law.
It is interesting to consider the background of the Massa-
chusetts legislation. Until the middle of the nineteenth century,
children who had been neglected by their families were also
ignored by society and the state. The devices of apprenticeship
and indenture helped to alleviate the undesirable conditions, but
these procedures were relics of an economic and social era long
past.11 The industrial revolution not only accentuated the exist-
ing problem but broadened its scope. Industrial home production
gave way to machine and factory production and the old methods
of apprenticeship and indenture became unsatisfactory and in-
adequate to cope with the new situation.
The growing seriousness of the problem gradually gave birth
to the realization that there existed a community responsibility
for the welfare of dependent children. Child welfare activity
and legislation began to develop. In 1849 the American Female
Guardian Society was incorporated in New York with authority
to place children in suitable employment with some proper per-
son in conformity with the state laws dealing with indigent
persons.12 And at approximately the same time, the Children's
Aid Society of New York was founded with the original pur-
pose of sending destitute city children to distant country homes;
this is reported to have been the beginning of systematized child-
placing in America. s The 1851 Massachusetts adoption statute
fns. 5 and 6, antedated the Massachusetts statute, but they were patterned
after the civil law and are not considered as a part of the history of
American adoption statutes. Moreover, Texas was not a state of the Union
in 1850.
10. Mass. Acts & Resolves of 1851, c. 324.
11. An Elizabethan statute had established these institutions as part of
the common law. (1601) 43 Eliz. c. 2.
12. N. Y. Laws of 1849, c. 244 §6.
13. Brooks, Adventuring in Ado2tion (1939) 102.
19481
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was a part of the same movement and was designed to provide
a method whereby a homeless child could be placed in a home
and become a part of a family.
The fact that adoption legislation in the United States was
enacted for the welfare of the child is further established by a
report of a group of Commissioners appointed in 1865 to codify
the law of the State of New York It recited that the total
absence of any adoption provision was one of the most glaring
defects of New York law; that thousands of children were actu-
ally, though not legally adopted each year; that there was no
method whereby the adopting parents could secure the children
to themselves, except by an inappropriate and fictitious appren-
ticeship which permitted the natural parents to reclaim their
child when they saw it grow to an age of usefulness and intelli-
gence; and that there were many childless parents who would
gladly adopt children, but for their well-grounded fears that
they could never hold them securely. 4 It is significant that no
mention is made in the report of inheritance rights and that the
proposed statute embodied no provision on the subject.5
It is plain, therefore, that the American institution of adoption
was sustained by a current of opinion looking to individual per-
sonal needs, especially of the child, rather than to the needs of
the larger family or of continuity in property units and manage-
ment-a current heralding the characteristic nineteenth century
American growth of social and legal emphasis on the small or
immediate family and its highly personalized relations.6
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTESTACY PROVISIONS AS A PART OF
ADOPTION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Although the Massachusetts legislators in 1851 were not pri.
marily concerned with inheritance rights, they did partially
recognize the fact that the new institution of adoption would
have implications in the field of intestate succession. An ex-
press provision was enacted to permit the adoptee to succeed
to the adoptor's estate, but none of the other factual possi-
14. N. Y. Comsrs. Rep. (1865) 36.
15. The statute submitted by the Commissioners was not passed. The
first New York adoption statute was enacted in 1873. (N. Y. Laws of 1873,
•c. 830.)
16. See any American study of The Family. In part this new emphasis
,on the immediate family was an outgrowth of the mobility of the population.
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bilities were covered. There was no provision with respect to
the child's right to inherit from the adoptor's lineal or collateral
relatives or from natural parents and kin, and no mention was
made of the rights of the adoptive or natural parents or rela-
tives to inherit from the adopted child. So completely was inter-
est centered on the immediate problem of the child that the
resulting relationships of the new family situation were not
considered.
In the typical American fashion of statutory borrowing, the
Massachusetts statute was used as the model for similar legis-
lation enacted in other jurisdictions throughout the country.
It was substantially copied by WisconsinI7 in 1853, Maine 8 in
1855, New Hampshire 9 in 1862, Oregon- in 1864, Rhode Island
2l
in 1866, and Minnesota 22 in 1876. In practically every instance
the inheritance provisions were as inadequately treated as they
were in the original Massachusetts act.
To the extent that express provisions were inserted in the
early statutes, they were, with few exceptions, conciliatory and
conservative-designed to make certain that the time-honored
course of intestate succession among blood relatives would not
be disrupted by the innovation. For example, the New York
statute expressly stated that no inheritance rights were to be
conferred by the adoption.2 3 This provision remained in effect
for a period of fourteen years. In 1887 the New York legislature
permitted the adoptor and the adoptee to inherit from each
other but expressly declared that the child's right of inheritance
and succession from natural parents should remain unaffected
by the adoption.
2 4
Although it became customary to give the adoptee the right
of succession from the adoptor, the legislatures were reluctant
to accord reciprocal rights to the adoptor. This reluctance can
probably be attributed to a desire to protect the child and dis-
courage predatory adoption. In Illinois, for example, the first
adoption statute expressly provided that the "adopted father or
17. Wis. Acts of 1853, c. 85.
18. Me. Laws of 1855, c. 189.
19. N. H. Laws of 1862, c. 2603.
20. Ore. Laws of 1864, 692.
21. R. I. Laws of 1866, c. 627.
22. Minn. Laws of 1876, c. 41.
23. N. Y. Laws of 1873, c. 830.
24. N. Y. Laws of 1887, c. 703.
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mother shall never inherit from the child.1 25 When succession
rights were eventually given to the adoptors, they were care-
fully limited to property that the adoptee had obtained from
the adoptors by gift, bequest, devise or descent. 2 This form
of limited inheritance for the adoptor gradually gained in popu-
larity and today can be found in a number of statutes.21
Moreover, it is impossible to find an early statute which, in
express terms, created reciprocal rights of intestate succession
between the adoptee and the adoptor's lineal or collateral rela-
tives.
Generally speaking there were relatively few provisions deal-
ing with intestacy problems. The legislatures pioneering in
adoption statutes apparently failed to give serious consideration
to this aspect of the adoptive relationship.
The problems, however, were inherent in the new relationship
and as they came to the surface, the legislatures in a few juris-
dictions attempted to meet them by inserting express provi-
sions into the statutes. The added provisions oftentimes effected
some degree of departure from the common-law theory that con-
sanguinity should govern the course of descent.
The history of the Pennsylvania statute offers a good example
of the general manner in which the legislation in this field has
developed. The first Pennsylvania statute was adopted in 1855.
It contained a provision that the adoptee should become an heir
of the adoptor and it even went further to permit the adoptee
and the adoptor's legitimate children to inherit from and through
each other as if all had been children of the same parent.28 (The
latter provision evidences a recognition of the small-family rela-
tionship and is definitely not typical of the early statutes.) In
1877 a provision was added to permit the adoptor to inherit
from the adoptee, to the exclusion of the latter's natural parents
and kin, such property as the adopted child inherited or derived
from the adoptor or the adoptive relatives.2 It was not until
1915 that the adoptor was permitted to inherit regardless of the
source from which the adoptee's intestate estate was derived.0
25. II. Laws of 1867, 133.
26. Ill. Rev. Stat. (Hurd, 1874) 129.
27. Infra, pp. 228-232.
28. Pa. Laws of 1855, 491.
29. Pa. Laws of 1887, 53.
30. Pa. Laws of 1915, 580.
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The 1915 amendment went further and provided that the adoptor
and adoptee should inherit not only from but also through each
other as fully as if the adoptee had been born a lawful child
of the adopting parent.31 Two years later the statute was again
amended, this time to permit adoptive relatives to inherit and
take from and through the adoptee to the exclusion of the
adoptee's natural parents, grandparents and collateral relatives.
By the same act it was provided that the adoptee shall not be
entitled to inherit from or through the natural parents, grand-
parents or collateral relatives.32 In 1941 another factual possi-
bility was given statutory recognition in the form of an amend-
ment covering the situation in which the adoptee's natural parent
is a spouse of the adoptor33
Whereas the history of the Pennsylvania legislation is illus-
trative of the spasmodic and piecemeal development of the legis-
lation on this subject, few states have progressed as far as
Pennsylvania toward achieving a complete statutory coverage
of the problem.3 4
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT-DAY STATUTES IN THE
UNITED STATES
A comparative analysis of the existing statutory provisions
in forty-nine's jurisdictions serves to reveal the manner in
which the intestacy aspects of adoption are presently covered. 8
I. Intestacy rights between adoptor and adoptee.
A. Right of adoptee to inherit from adoptor.
36 states permit the adoptee to inherit the same as a legiti-
mate natural-born child:
Alabama Kansas Ohio
Arizona Kentucky Oklahoma
Arkansas Louisiana Oregon
31. Ibid.
82. Pa. Laws of 1917, 429 §16 a, b.
88. Pa. Laws of 1941, 424.
84. There are comparatively few jurisdictions which have approached
what might be recognized as a statutory codification of the law. The Dis-
trict of Columbia and Texas statutes are relatively complete. (See Appen-
dix for citations to current statutes.)
85. The forty-eight states plus the District of Columbia.
86. The statutory references on which the classification is premised are
listed in the Appendix. In a few cases, the provisions are set forth in the
section of the statutes dealing with intestate estates. More often, they are
a part of the adoption statutes.
1948]
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California Maryland Pennsylvania
Colorado Massachusetts Rhode Island
Connecticut Michigan South Carolina
Delaware Minnesota Texas
District of Columbia Missouri Vermont
Florida Nevada Virginia
Illinois New Hampshire Washington
Indiana New Jersey West Virginia
Iowa New York Wisconsin
5 states provide that the right of inheritance shall depend
upon the decree of adoption :7
Maine Tennessee
Mississippi Wyoming
North Carolina
8 states have statutes which are not explicit:88
Georgia Nebraska South Dakota
Idaho New Mexico Utah
Montana North Dakota
B. Right of the adoptor to inherit from the adoptee.
19 states expressly permit the adoptor to inherit as if he
or she were the natural parent of the adoptee:
Alabama Kansas Pennsylvania
California Kentucky Rhode Island
Colorado Louisiana Texas"
Connecticut Minnesota Vermont
District of Columbia Missouri Wisconsin
Florida Nevada
Iowa New York
15 states regard the source of the adoptee's estate as deter-
minative of the adoptor's right to inherit :4
37. One of the states (Miss.) provides that there shall be no right of
inheritance unless there be a court order to that effect at the time of
adoption; the other four states (Me., N. Car., Tenn. and Wyo.) provide
that the right to inherit shall exist unless limited by the decree of the court.
38. No attempt is made in this statutory analysis to resolve any statutory
ambiguity by reference to court decisions. The classification is based solely
on the face value of the statute, disregarding the possibility of interpreta-
tion in one direction or the other. The statutes in these eight states ordi-
narily provide that the adoptee and adoptor shall sustain toward each other
the legal relation of parent and child and have all the rights and be subject
to all the duties of that relation.
39. The Texas provisions are apparently contradictory. This classifica-
tion is based on article 46a, section 9, which seems to supersede article 2572.
40. No attempt has been made to sub-classify the various provisions in
these states. Some provide that the adoptor shall inherit all of the estate
except that which comes from the adoptee's natural parents or kin; others
provide that the adoptor or his kin shall inherit only that portion which
came from the adoptor.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss4/2
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Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
New Hampshire
New Jersey
Ohio
Oklahoma
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
10 states have statutes which are not explicit: 41
Idaho North Carolina Utah
Montana North Dakota Wyoming
Nebraska Ohio
New Mexico South Dakota
3 states have no provision on this subject:
Delaware Mississippi South Carolina
2 states expressly deny the adoptor the right to inherit:
Georgia Tennessee
II. Intestacy rights between adoptee and natural parents.
A. Right of adoptee to inherit from natural parents.
12 states expressly permit the adoptee to inherit:
Alabama Indiana New York
Arkansas Massachusetts Ohio
Florida Michigan Texas
Kentucky New Jersey West Virginia
5 states expressly deny the right:
California District of Columbia
Connecticut Louisiana Pennsylvania
32 states have no explicit provision :42
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Wyoming
Wisconsin
41. See footnote 38, supra.
42. Many of these states have provisions to the effect that the natural
parents shall be freed of all obligations and duties toward the adoptee and
the latter shall be freed of all obligations of maintenance and obedience;
others provide that the adoptee shall be treated in all respects as the child
of the person adopting; others have a provision that all rights and duties
and all legal relationship shall cease.
Arizona
Arkansas
Illinois
Indiana
Maine
Arizona
Colorado
Delaware
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota
1948]
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B. Right of natural parents to inherit.
8 states expressly deny the right:
California Florida
"Colorado"4 3  Kansas
District of Columbia New York
"Pennsylvania"
Texas
4
'
15 states expressly or impliedly permit the natural parents
to inherit all that the adoptive parents or relatives are pro-
hibited from inheriting :45
Arizona Maryland Ohio
Arkansas Massachusetts Oklahoma
Illinois Michigan Virginia
Indiana New Hampshire Washington
Maine New Jersey West Virginia
3 states permit the natural parents to take only in the ab-
sence of adoptive relatives :46
Iowa Kentucky' 7  Wisconsin
23 states have no explicit provision and their statutes are
subject to diverse interpretation :48
Alabama Missouri Rhode Island
Connecticut Montana South Carolina
Delaware Nebraska South Dakota
Georgia New Mexico Tennessee
Idaho Nevada Utah
Louisiana North Carolina Vermont
Minnesota North Dakota Wyoming
Mississippi Oregon
III. Intestacy rights between adoptee and adoptive relatives.
A. Right of adoptee to inherit:
2 states grant the right as to lineal and collateral adoptive
relatives:
Connecticut Minnesota
6 states grant the right to inherit from natural children of
adoptor, but make no express reference to the ascendant or
collateral relatives:
43. Quotation marks indicate that the law may be interpreted to permit
inheritance in the absence of adoptive relatives.
44. See footnote 39, supra.
45. See footnote 39, supra. When the statute provides that the adoptive
relatives are to take a certain portion of the adoptee's estate, it is often
left to implication that the natural parents are to take the balance of the
estate.
46. See also footnote 43, supra.
47. Natural parents take in the absence of adopting parents and ahead
of adoptive relatives.
48. For the different types of provisions, see footnote 42, supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss4/2
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
District of Columbia"' New Jersey Ohio
Massachusetts- New York Texas
6 states deny the right to inherit from lineal or collateral
kin by right of representation:
Illinois Oklahoma Rhode Island
Maine Oregon West Virginia
35 states have no provision on the subject.
B. Right of adoptive relatives to inherit.
9 states permit the adoptive relatives to inherit:
Colorado Kentucky5  Pennsylvania
District of Columbia Minnesota Texas
Iowa Nevada Wisconsin
4 states permit natural children of adoptor to inherit but
make no express reference to ascendant or collateral rela-
tives:
Massachusetts52 New York
New Jersey Ohio
14 states regard the source of the adoptee's estate as deter-
minative of the adoptive relative's right:
Arizona Maryland Oklahoma
Arkansas Massachusetts Virginia
Illinois Michigan Washington
Indiana New Jersey West Virginia
Maine Ohio
22 states have no provision on the subject.
IV. Intestacy rights as between adoptee and natural relatives.
The statutes generally contain no provision on this subject and
an accurate or helpful analysis is impossible.
The foregoing analysis reveals a surprising degree of dis-
similarity among the statutory provisions. It is difficult to find
any two states with identical provisions governing succession
by and from the adopted child. In fact, it would require a skilled
mathematician to calculate the number of variations in the rules
covering the several phases of the problem.
49. The District of Columbia statute could be construed to permit inheri-
tance from all lineal adoptive relatives, whether ascendant or descendant
50. The Massachusetts statute expressly denies the right to inherit from
collateral adoptive kin, but makes no reference to ascendant lineal relatives
of the adoptor.
51. Adoptive and natural relatives share equally.
5L. See footnote 50, supra.
1948]
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A few trends may be noted: An increasing number of states
accord intestacy rights to the adoptive parents and relatives
but there is still a reluctance to permit the adoptee to inherit
from the adoptor's relatives. It is also possible to discern the
beginning of a movement to deny the child's right to inherit
from the natural parents and an even more pronounced tendency
to cut off the natural parents' right to succeed to the intestate
estate of the adoptee.
The most striking and general feature of the present-day
provisions is the serious inadequacy in their coverage of the
problem. In some respects in a few jurisdictions there have
been improvements over the early statutes, but, generally
speaking, the statutory provisions fail in their duty to state
the law which shall govern in such circumstances. Where at-
tempts have been made to deal more widely with the matter, the
product has obviously suffered from the lack of skilled drafts-
manship,' studied consideration, and a genuine appreciation of
the problem. It follows that the statutes furnish little guidance
to either the layman or the lawyer who is searching for the law.
The ambiguity and incompleteness of the provisions lead only
to confusion, uncertainty and misunderstanding, and are pro-
vocative of unnecessary litigation.
THE LAW AS IT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BY THE COURTS
In the absence of clear and positive legislative declarations
of the law, the courts have been compelled to determine the law
which shall govern intestate succession by and from an adopted
child. Although the courts have attempted to describe their
task as limited to an interpretation of the statutes, it must be
recognized that the statutes are frequently inadequate and that
the courts have, in reality, written the law to fill in the gaps
left by the legislatures. This fact is further substantiated by
the obviously different constructions which various courts have
placed on statutes substantially similar in wording. It remains,
therefore, to examine and analyze the law on this subject as it
has been established by the courts.
The adoptee's right to inherit from the relatives of the
adoptor:5q-The success of the adontee's efforts to share in the
53. The right to inherit from the adoptor is generally covered by statute(see statutory analysis, pp. 228-232), and there has been little or no litiga-
tion on this question.
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intestate estate of his adoptive relatives has in practically every
instance"' depended upon the court's inclination to interpret the
applicable statute either in a strict or liberal manner. The
loosely-worded statutes are putty in the hands of judges and
the court decisions have been molded by the judicial temper with
which the problem has been approached.
The strict-construction courts have permitted the adoptee to
inherit only from the adoptor and not from the adoptor's lineal
or collateral kin, either directly or through the right of repre-
sentation. 5 Inasmuch as it is reasonable to assume that both
54. In one or two cases the court has been able to ascertain the legisla-
tive intent from a study of the history of the statutory provision. See, e. g.,
In re Sauer's Estate (1934) 216 Wis. 289, 257 N. W. 28.
56. The following citations do not include cases which have been super-
seded by a complete and express statutory provision either granting or deny-
ing the right of inheritance from adoptive relatives. Cases involving wills
are labelled and included where the decision hinged upon a construction
of the intestacy statutes. The parenthetical insertions describe the relation
between the decedent and the adoptee. Fed.: Shoemaker v. Newman (1933)
62 App. D. C. 120, 65 F. (2d) 208 [cert. den. (1933) 290 U. S. 656]
(grandfather). Cal.: In re Pence's Estate (1931) 117 Cal. App. 323, 4 P.
(2d) 202 (will case; uncle); In re Jones' Estate (1935) 3 Cal. App. (2d)
P. (2d) 1071 (second cousin). Colo.: In re Warr's Estate (Colo. 1943)
187 P. (2d) 408. Ky.: Merritt v. Morton (1911) 143 Ky. 133, 136 S.
W. 133 (grandparent); Sanders v. Adams (1939) 278 Ky. 24, 128 S.
W. (2d) 223 (dictum in will case); Woods v. Crump (1940) 283 Ky.
675, 142 S. W. (2d) 680 (dictum in case involving a deed). Mich.: Moritz
v. Callender (1939) 291 Mich. 190, 289 N. W. 126 (will case; uncle). Mo.:
(The strict construction rule will apparently be applied to all cases where
the adoption took place prior to the Missouri act of 1917.) Hockaday v.
Lynn (1906) 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585 (uncle); McIntyre v. Hardesty
(Mo. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 334 (will case; great-great-grandparent);
Weber v. Griffiths (Mo. 1942) 159 S. W. (2d) 670 (sister). The language
in two recent cases indicates that the Missouri courts may permit inheri-
tanee if the child was adopted pursuant to the,1917 act. (McIntyre v.
Hardesty, supra, and St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill (Mo. 1934) 76
S. W. (2d) 685. N. Y.: Kettell v. Baxter (1906) 50 Misc. 428, 100 N. Y. S.
529; In re Powell's Estate (1920) 112 Misc. 74, 183 N. Y. S. 939 (aunt);
Hopkins v. Hopkins (1922) 202 App. Div. 606, 195 N. Y. S. 605 [aff'd,
286 N. Y. 545, 142 N. E. 277] (uncle); In re Brenner's Estate (1933) 149
Misc. 412, 267 N. Y. S. 765; In re Cuddeback's Will (1940) 174 Misc. 322,
20 N. Y. S. (2d) 862 (will case); cf. In re Hecker's Estate (1942) 178
Misc. 449, 88 N. Y. S. (2d) 365, wherein the court, as dictum in a case
involving a will, stated that "the trend of the more recent decisions has
been to extend rather than to restrict the right of inheritance of an adopted
child." (In U. S. Trust Co. v. Hoyt (1915) 115 Misc. 663, 190 N. Y. S.
166 [aff'd by Ct. of App. (1918) 119 N. E. 1083] the New York court
adopted a liberal approach, but in subsequent cases the courts have refused
to follow it and in the Brenner case, supra, the Hoyt case was said to have
little value as an authority.) N. Car.: Grimes v. Grimes (1935) 207 N. C.
778, 178 S. E. 573 (grandparent). Ohio: Quigley v. Mitchell (1884) 41
Ohio 375 (grandparent); Phillips v. McConica (1898) 59 Ohio 1, 51
N. E. 445 (will case; great-grandparent); Pickering v. Koesling (1928)
30 Ohio App. 201, 164 N. E. 537 (uncle); Southern Ohio Say. Bank & T.
1943]
Washington University Open Scholarship
234 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 28
the courts and legislatures following this rule have been
prompted by similar considerations, it is interesting to analyze
the judicial attitude underlying this line of decisions.
The decisions seem to be attributable to a reverence for blood
relationship. The common-law scheme of intestate succession
was established on the principle of consanguinity and these
courts regard consanguinity as so fundamental in the statutes
of descent and distribution that it cannot be ignored unless a
statute, by express language or inexorable implication, so directs.
In one of the most cited cases on this subject 8 the judge stated
that "the blood tie is the open sesame to unlock the treasure of
inheritance" and that a stranger to the blood must be excluded.
In at least two jurisdictions,57 the right to inherit property
by reason of blood relationship has been exalted to the position
of a natural right. It is therefore naturally given precedence
over the so-called artificial right arising from an adoption. The
Wisconsin court in the Bradley case referred to the consan-
guinity principle as "a tenet of justice, intuitively and generally
recognized, and crystallized into forms of law by common con-
sent," 8 and denied the adoptee's claim to share in a four million
dollar estate.59
It is common practice on the part of the strict-constructionist
Co. v. Boyer (Ohio 1940) 31 N. E. (2d) 161 (dictum). Okla.: In re Cap-
tain's Estate (Okla. 1942) 130 P. (2d) 1002 (brother). Note however, the
strong dissent of two judges. Ore.: In re Hayes' Estate (Ore. 1939) 86
P. (2d) 424 (will case; grandparent); Cf., In re Buell's Estate (Ore. 1941)
117 P. (2d) 832. S. Dak.: In re Eddin's Estate (S. D. 1938) 279 N. W.
244 (grandparent). Tenn.: Helms v. Elliott (1890) 89 Tenn. 446, 14 S. W.
930 (natural child of adoptor); Taylor v. Taylor (1931) 162 Tenn. 482, 40
S. W. (2d) 393 (uncle). Texas: Fletcher v. Persall (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
75 S. W. (2d) 170 (uncle). R. I.: Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller (1916)
39 R. I. 45, 97 Atl. 378. Utah: In re Harrington's Estate (Utah 1938) 85
P. (2d) 630 (grandparent). Vt.: Moore v. Estate of Moore (1862) 35 Vt.
98 (uncle). Wis.: In re Bradley's Estate (1925) 185 Wis. 393, 201 N. W.
973 (uncle).
56. Hockaday v. Lynn (1906) 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585.
57. North Carolina [Grimes v. Grimes (1935) 207 N. C. 778, 178 S. E.
573] and Wisconsin [In re Bradley's Estate (1925) 185 Wis. 393, 201 N. W.
973].
58. (1925) 201 N. W. 973, 974. Wisconsin is practically the only state
which persists in holding that the right to inherit property is a natural
right which the legislature cannot destroy. This principle was enunciated
in Nunnemacher v. State (1906) 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627.
59. The applicable statute provided that the adoptee should be deemed
for purposes of inheritance and succession the same as if born in natural
wedlock except that he should not be capable of taking property limited
to heirs of the body.
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courts to proceed on the theory that adoption is a contractual
relationship.6° From this premise it is reasoned that only the
adopting parents are parties to the contract and that, although
they have a perfect right to obligate themselves to make the
child their heir, they are powerless to extend this right to per-
mit the adoptee to inherit from persons not parties to the con-
tract.
Moreover, these courts frequently resort to the rule of con-
struction that statutes in derogation of the common law must be
strictly construed.61 It is indicative of the weakness of this argu-
ment that the courts are not consistent in urging its application.
For example, the Wisconsin court in the Bradley case6 2 admits
that general provisions of adoption statutes should be liberally
construed to carry out their beneficent purpose, but refuses to
permit a liberal construction to divert the descent of property
from its natural course. A Tennessee court earnestly contends
that the statute should be liberally construed when the adoptee
is seeking to inherit from the adoptor, but that the rule of strict
construction should apply when the adoptee seeks to inherit from
a relative of the adoptor.6 3
Although the "derogation of common law" rule has been used
as a convenient argument by courts trying to justify a strict
interpretation, its applicability to adoption cases is extremely
questionable.
The strict-construction decisions presently constitute the
weight of authority, but there is a growing list of courts that
construe the statutes liberally and permit the adoptee to inherit
from the adoptive relatives.6 4 These courts have held that adop-
60. The contract theory is set forth in the following cases cited in foot-
note 55, supra. Merritt v. Morton (Ky.), Hockaday v. Lynn and Weber v.
Griffiths (Mo.), In re Hayes' Estate. (Ore.), In re Eddin's Estate (S. D.),
and In re Bradley's Estate (Wis.).
61. See, e. g., the opinions in the following cases 'cited in footnote 55,
supra. Hockaday v. Lynn (Mo.), Grimes v. Grimes (N. C.), In re Cap-
tain's Estate (Okla.), In re Eddin's Estate (S. D.), Helms v. Elliott
(Tenn.), and In re Bradley's Estate (Wis.).
62. (1925) 185 Wis. 393, 201 N. W. 973.
68. Marshall v. Marshall (Tenn. 1941) 156 S. W. (2d) 449, 452.
64. Iowa: Schick v. Howe (1908) 137 Iowa 249, 114 N. W. 916 (grand-
parent); McCune v. Oldham (1932) 213 Iowa 1221, 240 N. W. 678 (aunt).
Kan.: Riley v. Day (1913) 88 Kan. 503, 129 Pac. 524 (grandparent); Den-
ton v. Miller (1922) 110 Kan. 292, 203 Pac. 693 (uncle); In re Riemann's
Estate (1927) 124 Kan. 539, 262 Pac. 16 (uncle). Neb.: In re Taylor's
Estate (1989) 8 Neb. S. Ct. J. 639, 285 N. W. 538 (grandparent). Pa.:
In re Cave's Estate (1937) 326 Pa. 358, 192 Atl. 460 (great-aunt). Wash.:
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tion statutes, including the intestacy provisions, should be con-
strued to effectuate the humane policy which prompted their
enactment-the promotion of the welfare of the child. From this
premise these courts reason that the legislature intended to give
the adopted child the status of a natural child and all of the
incidents of that status, including the capacity to inherit from
lineal and collateral adoptive relatives as well as from the
adoptor.
These courts refuse to follow the "derogation of common law"
rule of construction. 5 As stated by the dissenting judge in a
1942 Oklahoma case, "principles of construction are out of place
and pernicious if they are . . . sought to destroy the effect of
a legislative enactment, and to warp it from the true and plain
meaning of the legislature.68
It is significant that the liberal position is espoused chiefly by
courts west of the Mississippi River.67 Perhaps the peculiar
geographical division can be explained, in part, by the fact that
the principle of consanguinity did not take as firm a hold in
the western states where pride was taken in an asserted freedom
from "hide-bound tradition."
The judicial trend appears to be toward the liberal rule and
a recognition of the adoptee's right to succeed to the estate of
adoptive relatives. Even some of the strict-construction courts
have been wavering. In a recent Ohio case,68 for example, the
court ridicules the idea, expressed in an earlier opinion,69 to the
effect that consanguinity is a sacred and unimpeachable prin-
ciple. The North Carolina court in 1940 admitted that sentiment
and concern with the humanities and social adjustments would
dictate a different conclusion than that which it felt compelled
to reach.70 And a New York court has recently expressed itself
to the effect that the trend of recent decisions has been to ex-
In re Masterson's Estate (1919) 108 Wash. 307, 183 Pac. 93 (natural
child of adoptor); In re Waddell's Estate (1924) 131 Wash. 566, 230 Pac.
822 (uncle). Wyo.: In re Cadwell's Estate (1920) 26 Wyo. 412, 186 Pac.
499 (uncle). It should be noted that one of the strongest liberal opinions
is that by the dissenting judges in In re Captain's Estate (Okla. 1942)
130 P. (2d) 1002, 1009. (The parenthetical notation in each case refers
to the adoptive relation between the decedent and the adoptee.)
65. See, e. g., In re Riemann's Estate (1927) 124 Kan. 539, 262 Pac. 16.
66. In re Captain's Estate (Okla. 1942) 130 P. (2d) 1002, 1009.
67. See footnote 64, supra.
68. White v. Meyer (1940) 66 Ohio App. 549, 37 N. E. (2d) 546.
69. Phillips v. McConica (1898) 69 Ohio 1, 51 N. E. 445.
70. Ward v. Howard (1940) 217 N. C. 201, 7 S. E. (2d) 625, 629.
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tend rather than to restrict the right of inheritance of an adopted
child.7 1
The adoptee's right to inherit from natural parents and
kin: 2 -In view of the split of authority on the question just
considered, one would also expect to find a disagreement among
the courts on the question involving the adoptee's right to suc-
ceed to the intestate estate of natural parents and kin. But the
decisions evidence almost unanimous agreement among the
courts. The generally applicable rule is that the adoption should
not be held to deprive the adoptee of the right to inherit from
natural relatives, unless there is an express statutory provision
denying such right.7 .
Some courts contend that the natural course of descent be-
tween blood kindred should not be severed unless the legislature
has clearly so directed ;74 other courts place emphasis upon the
proposition that the adoptee, who is usually an infant when
adopted, should not be deprived of the right to inherit inasmuch
as his intelligent consent to the adoption could not have been
secured ;75 and it is possible to find both of these positions taken
71. This was dictum by Surrogate Judge Foley in a case involving a will.
In re Hecker's Estate (1942) 178 Misc. 449, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 365.
72. The same rule is generally applicable whether the intestate be a
natural parent or relative. But see the California situation, footnote 73,
infra.
73. (Where express statute now covers the subject, earlier cases are
omitted.) Cal.: In re Darling's Estate (1916) 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606,
permitting inheritance from grandparent even though the statute expressly
severs the right to inherit from parents. Colo.: In re Wilson's Estate (1934)
95 Colo. 159, 33 P. (2d) 969. Iowa: Wagner v. Varner (1879) 50 Iowa
582. Kan.: Dreyer v. Schrick (1919) 105 Kan. 495, 185 Pac. 30 (dictum):
In re Bartram's Estate (1921) 109 Kan. 87, 198 Pac. 192. Minn.: Roberts
v. Roberts (1924) 160 Minn. 140, 199 N. W. 581. Miss.: Sledge v. Floyd
(1925) 139 Miss. 398, 104 So. 163, holding that, in the absence of a pro-
vision in the adoption decree, the right of inheritance will be allowed.
Mo.: Clarkson v. Hatton (1898) 143 Mo. 47, 44 S. W. 761 (dictum). A
Federal Court in Burnes v. Burnes (1904) 132 Fed. 485 [aff'd in 137 Fed.
781 (cert. den. 199 U. S. 605)] declared (dictum) such a rule to be the
Missouri law. N. Y.: In re Landers' Estate (1917) 100 Misc. 635, 166
N. Y. S. 1086. (Every New York statute since 1887 has provided that the
child's right of inheritance from his natural parents shall remain unaffected
by the adoption. The Landers case held that the rule should be extended
to permit the child to inherit from his natural kin. The rule is quoted
with approval in In re Gourlay's Estate (1940) 173 Misc. 930, 19 N. Y. S.
(Rd) 122.) S. Dak.: Sorenson v. Churchill (1927) 51 S. D. 113, 212 N. W.
488. Wash.: In re Roderick's Estate (1930) 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac. 325.
74. See, e. g., In re Roderick's Estate (1930) 158 Wash. 377, 291 Pac.
825.
75. See, e. g., Delano v. Bruerton (1889) 148 Mass. 619, 20 N. E. 308.
This argument is associated, in some jurisdictions, with the idea that adop-
tion is a contractual status'and that precaution must be taken to protect
the rights of the child who was not a party to the contract.
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in the same opinion76 It therefore appears that in a case of this
nature, both the consanguinity principle and the welfare-of-the-
child theory can be used to reach the same conclusion, whereas
they lead to conflicting decisions in a case where the adoptee
seeks to inherit from adoptive relatives. This may explain the
fact that the courts are in substantial agreement on the instant
question.
Although the rule has the effect in practically every state of
permitting inheritance from both natural and adoptive parents,
the courts have not been bothered by this fact. They merely state
that in the absence of statute there is no policy preventing dual
inheritance.
An interesting problem arises where the child has been
adopted by a natural relative. It is not uncommon for a child
to be adopted by a natural grandparent, and upon the latter's
intestate death, the courts have been called upon to decide
whether the child is entitled to inherit, in his dual capacity, two
distinct shares-one share as an adopted child, and the other
as a natural grandchild.
Decisions in Colorado7 7, Iowa, 7 and Kansas 9 have sanctioned
the child's right to take two separate shares. The Iowa and
Kansas courts recognized the inequality resulting from such a
decision, but concluded that it is created by statute and that
exceptional cases of apparent hardship and inequality must occa-
sionally occur. On the other hand, the Colorado court attempted
to rationalize its decision by asserting that the grandparent
could use either the medium of a will or the procedure of adop-
tion to increase the normal intestate share of the grandchild.
(This reasoning appears rather tenuous in view of the absence
of any evidence to indicate that the child had been adopted for
inheritance purposes.)
The contrary position has been taken by the courts in Indi-
ana180 Massachusetts,81 and Pennsylvania 82 as well as by a Fed-
76. See, e. g., In re Wilson's Estate and Sorenson v. Churchill, supra,
fn. 73.
-77. In re Wilson's Estate (1934) 95 Colo. 159, 33 P. (2d) 969.
78. Wagner v. Varner (1879) 50 Iowa 532.
79. In re Bartram's Estate (1921) 109 Kan. 87, 198 Pac. 192.
80. Billings v. Head (1916) 184 Ind. 361, 111 N. E. 177; Head v. Leak(1916) 61 Ind. App. 253, 111 N. E. 952.
81. Delano v. Bruerton (1889) 148 Mass. 619, 20 N. E. 308.
82. Morgan v. Reel (1905) 213 Pa. 81, 62 Atl. 253. Since this decision
was rendered, the Pennsylvania statute has been amended to prohibit in-
heritance from natural kin. (See statutory analysis, pp. 228-232).
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eral district court8 3 Although these courts sanction dual inheri-
tance when the child is adopted by a stranger, they deny the
right in cases where the adoptor is a natural relative. The at-
tempts made to justify a different rule in the two situations have
not been satisfactory,4 and there is disagreement among these
courts with respect to the one capacity in which the child should
be permitted to inherit8  This problem will be difficult to handle
as long as the courts continue to recognize the adoptee's right
to inherit from both natural and adoptive relatives.
The concept of dual inheritance has one other implication
which deserves brief consideration. A child once adopted is
sometimes adopted a second time and it is necessary for the
courts to pass upon the child's right to inherit from the first
adoptor and, in some states, from the relatives of the first
adoptor.
One group of courts has been influenced by the analogy pro-
vided by the rule which permits the adopted child to inherit
from the natural parent and has decided that the child should
inherit from the first adoptor.86 This type of decision requires
an acceptance of the view that the first adoption stands for all
time unless formally annulled.
Contrariwise the courts in two jurisdictions have ruled that
the second adoption automatically revokes and supersedes the
first adoption and terminates all incidents (including inheritance
rights) of any relationship that may have existed between the
first adoptor and the adoptee. 7
83. Burnes v. Burnes (1904) 132 Fed. 485 (dictum).
84. The Indiana court dogmatically states that the legislature did not
intend that an adopted child should ever inherit more than would a natural
child of the adopter. (Billings v. Head, supra, fn. 80) The Pennsylvania
court reasoned that the act of adoption had the effect of transferring the
child from the class of grandchildren to the class of children and that the
former class became merged in the latter. (Supra, fn. 82) The Massa-
chusetts decision recites that the general rule is designed to protect the
infant's rights and that there is no need for such a saving provision in
cases of this nature. Supra, fn. 81)
85. The Massachusetts rule permits inheritance only in the capacity
of an adopted child, presumably because this generally results in the
greater inheritance. (Supra, fn. 81) The Indiana rule, however, permits
the child to inherit in whichever capacity will permit the greater inheri-
tance. (Head v. Leak, supra, fn. 80)
86. See Patterson v. Browning (1896) 146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993;
Holmes v. Curl (1920) 189 Iowa 246, 178 N. W. 406; Dreyer v. Schrick
_1916) 105 Kan. 495, 185 Pac. 30; Villier v. Watson's Adm'x (1916) 16&
y. 631, 182 S. W. 869; In re Estate of Sutton (1925) 161 Minn. 426, 201
N. W. 925; In re Egley's Estate (Wash. 1943) 134 P. (2d) 943.
87. Michigan [In re Klapp's Estate (1917) 197 Mich. 615, 164 N. W.
881] and Oklahoma [In re Talley's Estate (1941) 188 Okla. 338, 109 P
1948]
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The foregoing paragraphs have been devoted to a considera-
tion of the rule permitting dual inheritance and to a discussion
of the satellite problems that have followed in its orbit. The
rule could claim the distinction of unanimous approval by the
courts but for a comparatively recent decision in New Hamp-
shire wherein the Supreme Court of that state held that adoption
terminates the right of the child to succeed to the intestate estate
left by a natural relativeY8 In view of the fact that this decision
involved the construction of a statute which was definitely sub-
ject to the contrary interpretation" and that it constitutes the
only exception to the general rule, it merits brief special atten-
tion.
The court views adoption as effecting a complete change in
status whereby natural relatives become strangers and others
take their place. It relies principally upon the statutory provi-
sion which directs that the adopted child shall acquire the status
of a natural child of the adopting parent.
In answer to the argument that the infant adoptee should
not be deprived of the right to inherit from natural kin, the
court states that such loss, 'if any, is more than offset by the
total benefits and advantages accruing to the child as a result
of the adoption. The purpose of adoption, says the court, is to
afford the child the same opportunity enjoyed by other children
and not to give the adopted child the undue advantage which
results from the application of the rule of dual inheritance.
The New Hampshire decision marks a sharp and significant
break from the general rule and suggests a new and funda-
mental approach to the problem. Perhaps it will serve as a
nucleus for other decisions contrary to the present weight of
authority.
(2d) 495]. Although a will was involved in the Oklahoma case, the
adoptee was not mentioned in it and his right to inherit turned upon his
right to claim the intestate share of an adopted child.
88. Young v. Bridges (1933) 86 N. H. 135, 165 At]. 272. In Stamford
Trust Co. v. Lockwood (1922) 98 Conn. 337, 119 Atl. 218, the Connecticut
court rendered a decision which can be interpreted as opposing the dual-
inheritance rule, but the case involves a will, and cannot be cited without
qualification.
89. The applicable statute contained a provision governing the distribu-
tion of an intestate adoptee's estate in the event it included property re-
ceived by gift "or inheritance" from the natural kin. This language could
have been relied upon to indicate legislative recognition of a right on the
part of the child to continue to inherit from the natural parents and kin.
But the court construed this provision to have reference only to property
inherited prior to adoption or property inherited from a testate estate.
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Inheritance from the adoptee:-A logical extension of the
majority judicial attitude expressed in the first of the two pre-
ceding sections would also call for a rule giving preference to
natural kin over the adoptive relatives as intestate successors
of the adoptee9 0 But the use of logical reasoning is misleading.
The present alignment of authority indicates that the 'courts
are in substantial agreement on the proposition that adoptive
kin should be preferred.9'
In this type of situation the courts have generally been in-
fluenced by the human aspects of the situation. Their decisions
evidence a hostile attitude toward the demands of natural par-
ents and kin who abandoned the child and disclaimed all duty
and responsibility toward it, and sympathy for the claims of the
adoptive parents and kin whose kindness and affection and
whose expenditure of time, labor and money were directly or
indirectly responsible for the fact that the adoptee left an estate
to be distributed.
A few of the courts have in this connection considered the
effect that the rule of law enunciated in their decisions might
have upon the institution of adoption.92 They refuse to sanction
a rule permitting natural relatives to inherit the fruit of the
adoptor's labor because they fear that such a rule would tend
90. The discussion in this section is predicated upon the assumption that
the adoptee was not survived by lineal descendants and that provision had
been made for the intestacy rights of a surviving spouse.
91. Cal.: In re Jobson's Estate (1912) 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938, per-
mitting widow of adoptor to inherit but refusing to pass upon the rights
of collateral adoptive relatives. Ga.: Alexander v. Lamar (1939) 188 Ga.
278, 3 S. . (2d) 656, permitting inheritance by adoptive sister although
statute precludes inheritance by adoptor. Iowa: In re Fitzgerald's Estate(1987) 228 Iowa 141, 272 N. W. 117, interpreting a slightly ambiguous
statute. Miss.: Brewer v. Browning (1917) 115 Miss. 358, 76 So. 267.
Mo.: Shepherd v. Murphy (1933) 332 Mo. 1176, 61 S. W. (2d) 746, dis-
tinguishing the earlier case of Reinders v. Koppelmann (1878) 68 Mo.
482. Neb.: In re Enyart's Estate (1928) 116 Neb. 450, 218 N. W. 89.
N. Y.: Carpenter v. Buffalo General Electric Co. (1914) 213 N. Y. 101,
106 N. E. 1026; In re Hollstein's Estate (1937) 251 App. Div. 771, 295
N. Y. S. 598; In re Heye's Estate (1933) 149 Misc. 890, 269 N. Y. S. 530.
S. Dak.: Calhoun v. Bryant (1911) 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W. 266. Wis.:
In re Hood's Estate (1931) 206 Wis. 227, 239 N. W. 448, upholding con-
stitutionality of statute giving adoptive kin preferential claim. Contra:
N. Mex.: Dodson v. Ward (1925) 31 N. M. 54, 240 Pac. 991, where the
court followed the consanguinity principle. N. Car.: Edwards v. Yearby(1915) 168 N. C. 663, 85 S. E. 19. (Other cases have been decided on this
point but they have been rendered obsolete by the enactment of express
statutory provisions.)
92. See, e. g., Alexander v. Lamar (Ga.) and Shepherd v. Murphy (Mo.)
ibid.
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to discourage adoptions. This pragmatic approach could be more
extensively used to advantage by legislatures as well as the
courts in the consideration of other problems in this field.
Although few would quarrel with the majority rule on this
question, it must be recognized that it is contrary in theory and
result to the rule denying the adoptee's right to inherit from
adoptive relatives9 3 When both rules prevail within a single
jurisdiction, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile
them.94 Although the courts deny the adoptee's right to inherit
from the adoptive relatives because he is a stranger to the blood
and not a party to the adoption contract, they conveniently for-
get these arguments when the case involves the adoptive rela-
tive's claim to share in the adoptee's intestate estate. The rules
applicable in these two types of cases should be consistent and
it is submitted that the relationship between them needs to be
reexamined in many jurisdictions by either the courts or the
legislatures95
A survey of the court decisions leads to the inescapable con-
clusion that the courts have not been successful in bringing
either order or certainty out of the confusion created by the
statutory provisions. The decisions are conflicting between juris-
dictions and even within given jurisdictions and few courts have
evidenced an overall understanding or appreciation of the gen-
eral problem. Unfortunately, the judicial talents have been dis-
sipated in working out independent decisions in individual cases
rather than employed in the formulation of integrated rules con-
sistent with and in furtherance of the institution of adoption.
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS PROBLEM'S
The extreme diversity among the statutes and decisions on
this subject has created an interesting and important problem
93. See discussion in text, pp. 233-234, and cases cited in footnote 55.
94. This inconsistency arises as a result of court decisions in California,
New York and South Dakota. (Compare case citations for these states in
footnote 55 with those in footnote 91.) Missouri is not included because
the Shepherd v. Murphy case cited in footnote 91 was decided under the
terms of the 1917 Act whereas the cases cited in footnote 55 involve adop-
tions which took place under an earlier statute.
95. The inconsistency arises in some states (e. g. Wisconsin) from the
express statutory provisions. See statutory analysis, supra, pp.
96. The purpose of this division is primarily to indicate the existence
of the conflict of laws problem. No attempt will be made to present an
exhaustive review of this aspect of the subject under consideration. For
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in the conflict of laws. The rule is well established in the field
of intestate succession that movables shall be distributed in
accordance with the law of the decedent's domicil and that the
descent of immovables shall be governed by the law of the state
in which the land is situated97 Adoption, however, introduces
a new variable and raises a question concerning the weight to
be given to the law of the state of adoption.
To a limited extent the problem has received legislative atten-
tion, 8 but it has generally been one for the courts to solve. The
basic issue to be decided by the courts is whether intestacy rights
are incidental to the adoption status or whether they constitute
an integral and fixed part of the status, which, when once created
by one state, must be recognized by the law of a different state.
There are a few cases holding that the intestacy rights are a
part of the adoptive status and should be controlled by the law
of the state of adoption."" But the majority rule on the question
favors the principle that intestacy rights are merely incidental
to the adoption status.1°0 As recently expressed by a Pennsyl-
vania court, the full faith and credit clause requires only that
a court recognize the adoption status of a child adopted in an-
other state; it does not compel one state to recognize the law
of a foreign state with respect to the effect of adoption on the
scheme of intestate succession."''
In view of the fact that inheritance provisions developed as an
incidental feature of the American law of adoption, 102 the pre-
vailing rule appears sound. The minority rule would be pref-
a more complete review of the cases, see Note (1942) 14 Miss. L. J. 269
and Note (1931) 73 A. L. R. 964.
97. See, e. g., 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) §245.1 (land) §303.2
(movables). This rule is also accepted by the American Law Institute.
Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) §245 (land) §303 (movables).
(1934) §247 (land), §305 (movables).
98. A few states have express statutes determining the intestacy rights
of a child adopted in a foreign state. The subject does not merit extensive
citations.
99. Shaver v. Nash (1930) 181 Ark. 1112, 29 S. W. (2d) 298; Slattery v.
Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. (1932) 115 Conn. 163, 161 Atl. 79; In re
Sunderland (1882) 60 Iowa 732, 13 N. W. 655; Shick v. Howe (1908)
187 Iowa 249, 114 N. W. 916; Brewer v. Browning (1917) 115 Miss. 358,
76 So. 267.
100. See Note (1931) 73 A. L. R. 964, 973. The prevailing rule is
approved by the American Law Institute. Restatement, Conflict of Laws
(1984) sec. 247 (land), sec. 305 (movables).
101. In re Zoell's Estate (1942) 345 Pa. 413, 29 A. (2d) 31. Cf. Hood
v. McGehee (1915) 237 U. S. 611.
102. See discussion of this point in text, supra, p. 232 and following.
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erable only in the event it could be shown that the principal
function of adoption is to serve as an inheritance device.
In addition to the foregoing problem, there is another question
which deserves brief mention at this point. Oftentimes, an
amendment of a statute causes a conflict between the provisions
which governed at the time of adoption and those which are in
effect at the time of the intestate's death. Although it is not
the usual type of conflict of laws problem, a "conflict of laws in
time" creates issues somewhat resembling those involved when
the laws of two different jurisdictions are in conflict.
With only one exception, the courts have held that inheritance
rights are merely an incident of the adoption status and that
there is no reason to depart from the normal rule that intestacy
rights should be determined by the law in effect at the time
of the intestate's death.103 There are, however, two recent Mis-
souri cases which hold that inheritance rights should be con-
trolled by the law in force at the time of adoption.m 04
The Missouri rule is unsound from two standpoints: (1) It
overlooks the fact, jist mentioned, that the American institution
was established for a purpose other than to serve as an inheri-
tance device. (2) It contravenes the'well-established principle
that no intestacy rights can arise prior to the death of the inte-
state.
A PROPOSED UNIFORIM CODIFICATION OF THE LAW
The legislatures and the courts have failed in their responsi-
bility to provide just and adequate rules of law to cope with the
intestacy problems created by the development of the American
institution of adoption. The uncertainty and inequality evident
in the law have frequently resulted in unjust, unanticipated,
and unconscionable dispositions of intestate estates affected by
an adoption.
As a consequence, the foresighted have been obliged to rely
103. The following citations are merely illustrative and do not include
all authority on the point: Brooks Bank & Trust Co. v. Rorabacher (1934)
118 Conn. 202, 171 Atl. 655; In re Rasmussen's Estate (1911) 114 Minn.
324, 131 N. W. 325; Anderson v. French (1915) 77 N. H. 509 93 At]
1042; Dodin v. Dodin (1897) 16 App. Div. 42, 44 N. Y. S. 800 [aff'd 162
N. Y. 635, 57 N. E. 1108]; In re Whitcomb's Will (1939) 170 Misc. 579,
10 N. Y. S. (2d) 824; Calhoun v. Bryant (1911) 28 S. D. 266, 133 N. W.
266; Hoch v. Hoch (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 162 S. W. (2d) 433.
104. McIntyre v. Hardesty (Mo. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 334; Weber v.
Griffiths (Mo. 1942) 159 S. W. (2d) 670.
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upon wills or trust instruments to make certain that their estates
will be properly distributed. In the absence of such precaution-
ary measures, the interested claimants have too often found it
necessary to engage in time-consuming and expensive litigation
in order to determine their respective rights. 0 5 There is an
urgent need for a comprehensive and uniform codification of
intestacy provisions carefully and intelligently designed in order
that they may work in harmony with and as' an integral part
of the American institution of adoption.
The drafting of such provisions requires an understanding of
the present status of adoption as a societal institution. Although
the function of the American institution of adoption has re-
mained the same since its origin almost a century ago, its status
has not remained constant.
The pioneering legislators who enacted the first adoption stat-
utes did not envision the abuses that were to develop and the
problems that were to arise from the new legislation, and few
administrative safeguards were provided. Adoptions were gen-
erally effected through the medium of private contract or deed.0 8
State supervision of adoption proceedings was almost unknown.
No provision was made for case investigations and practically
no steps were taken to insure the proper placement of the child.
Records were either inadequate or non-existent and there was
no requirement that the consent of the natural parents be se-
cured.
In the absence of proper administrative supervision, adoption
became contaminated by ignorant blundering and commercial-
ism. Bootleg adoptions of bargain-counter babies became wide-
spread and testified to the serious inadequacy of social regula-
tion.1 0 7
Moreover, the conception of adoption as an institution created
105. One writer states that there were 87 reported court decisions on
this subject in 32 jurisdictions during the 10 year period 1926-1937.[Brooks, Adventuring in Adoption (1939) 136.] To this figure must be
added the hundreds of cases which never reach the volumes of reported
cases.
106. This probably accounts for the development by the courts at an
early date of the concept that adoption is a contractual status. They failed
to look beyond the mere procedural formality by which the broader social
status was created.
107. Knox, The Family and the Law (1941) 109. Prior to 1922 it is
reported to have been a common practice in Virginia, for example, for
commercial maternity homes to sell babies born in their institutions. Ricks,
Legal Aspects of Adoption (1937) 4.
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for the welfare of the child was a new one, and the general
public had to be convinced that it differed from and offered some-
thing better than the apprenticeship and indenture systems.18
Coupled with this initial prejudice was the unfavorable reputa-
tion which soon developed from the fact that the children were
frequently misplaced. Oftentimes the child was unfit for adop-
tion and more often the adoptors were unfit to undertake pa-
rental duties. Briefly stated, the institution of adoption was all
right in theory but in practice it left much to be desired.
It was in this atmosphere that the currently-prevailing rules
governing intestate succession by and from the adopted child,
first developed. It is therefore not surprising to find a reluctance
on the part of the legislatures and the courts to permit an adop-
tion to upset the normal succession of intestate estates. Instead
of holding that the consanguinity principleo 9 should not be de-
parted from unless there is clear statutory language, the courts
during this period might have achieved the same result by a
more realistic and persuasive argument to the effect that the
adoption procedures were too questionable to merit a revision of
the well-established common-law rules of intestate succession.
The situation today, however, presents a sharp contrast-to that
which existed when the intestacy rules were formulated. Through
the reform activities of social agencies and the Federal Chil-
dren's Bureau during the past twenty-five years, corrective and
remedial legislation has been enacted in all but a few states to
stamp out the above-mentioned abuses, and the social aspects of
adoption legislation have been given new emphasis.
Adoptions by contract and deed have generally been discarded
in favor of more formal and adequate judicial proceedings.110
108. Peck, Adoption Laws in the United States (1925) U. S. Dept. of
Labor, Children's Bur. Pub. No. 148, p. 3.
109. The consanguinity principle had its origin during the feudal ages
and at that time served as a useful means to an end. Its importance and
utility as a guiding principle in the distribution of intestate estates has
diminished. (Witness the gradual diappearance of the doctrine of an-
cestral estates in the law of intestate succession.) There should be no
hesitancy to depart from it whenever it appears that another type of rela-
tionship is stronger than that created by blood-ties. One of the most illus-
trative instances in which the consanguinity principle has been departed
from is in the case of husband-wife relationship where the marital status
is generally recognized as creating stronger bonds than those which exist
between certain collateral relatives.
110. The legislatures have gradually come to the realization that adop-
tion is more than a contractual transaction and that it is an institution
dealing with human values. (Peck, op. cit., supra, fn. 108). This legis-
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In most states adoption has been placed under the supervision
of courts or other state agencies equipped for social diagnosis,
and child-placing agencies are now licenced and carefully regu-
lated. There are statutory requirements for thorough pre-adop-
tion case investigations to determine whether the child is physi-
cally and mentally fit for the prospective home and whether the
adoptors are qualified to assume the responsibilities of parent-
hood. At the same time the rights of the natural parents are
guarded by provisions making their consent a condition prece-
dent to adoption in all but a few exceptional cases. Moreover,
provision is generally made for a trial period of a few months
prior to legal adoption.
Other incidental safeguards have also been provided. For
example, adequate records of case histories are kept in files which
are wisely designated as private, and advertising of and for chil-
dren to be adopted has been prohibited."'
In other words, adoption no longer takes place by chance or
through commercial dealings. The necessary administrative and
supervisory procedures are now afforded and considerable care
is taken to protect the interests not only of the child but of the
natural and adoptive parents as well. One author, referring to
adoptions, has said that "we need fear them no more than natural
births, nor announce any different conclusions as to their out-
conme."22
The significant fact is that adoption has become a popular
institution."3 Foster home care has substantially replaced the
care of dependent children by orphan homes and other state in-
stitutions.11' In every state orphan asylums and other private
or state agencies provide adoption services,"' and it has been
lative development should serve to convince certain courts of the funda-
mental fallacy in deciding cases on the theory that they are dealing with a
lifeless contract. But the false concept continues to survive in some juris-
dictions. See, e. g., the recent Missouri case of Weber v. Griffiths (Mo.
1942) 159 S. W. (2d) 670, 674. Cf. Matter of Ziegler (1913) 82 Misc. 346,
143 N. Y. S. 562 [aff'd (1914) 161 App. Div. 589, 146 N. Y. S. 881].
111. More complete discussions concerning these recent developments in
adoption legislation may be found in numerous sources. See, e. g., Clarke,
Social Legislation (1940) 308: Heisterman, A Summary of Legislation on
Adoption (1935) 9 Sac. Serv. Rev. 269; Brooks, Adventuling in Adoption(1989) 122-3.
112. Gallagher, The Adopted Child (1936) 70.
118. Pendleton, New Aims in Adoption (1930) 151 Ann. Amer. Academy
154, 161.
114. Grace Abbott on Adoption, 1 Ency. of Soc. Sci., 459, 462.
115. (May 15, 1939) 33 Time 39.
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estimated that 16,000 children are adopted each year.116 In fact,
the demand for children to adopt has exceeded the supply."1 7
The present status of adoption has prompted one writer to
describe it as "social birth."1 8 The phrase is well chosen and
aptly expresses the fact that the adopted child is now regarded
as completely a part of the adoptor's family as if it had been
born into the family. The relatives as well as the immediate
family customarily accept the child into the family circle as a
matter of course.
On the other side of the picture, adoption today results in
a complete severance of all contacts between the adopted child
and the natural family. The adoptee becomes such an integral
part of the adoptive family that it is best for all concerned that
all relationship with the natural family be discontinued. It is
only the adoptive family which the child knows and, except for
the private files of case histories, the identity and existence of
natural kin are completely forgotten.
Adoption is today generally recognized as a procedure af-
forded by society whereby a new and satisfactory family status
can be established for the benefit of a child who had the mis-
fortune of being deprived of the family relationships normally
provided by natural parents and their kin. In legal and social
contemplation the child is taken from his natural family and
made a member of a new family with full standing as though
one of its blood.
When viewed against this realistic setting, the majority rules
governing intestate succession by and from the adopted child
appear ridiculously out of place and shamefully immodern. It
is evident that the intestacy law has not kept pace with the
growth of adoption on the American scene.
After reviewing the facts concerning the operation and status
of adoption as a societal institution, the pattern to be followed
in drafting the uniform and codified law becomes clear and well-
defined. The provisions should unquestionably be designed pur-
suant to and in furtherance of the currently-prevailing social
116. Mackenzie, A Boom in Adoptions, The New York Times Magazine
(Nov. 10, 1940) 6. The author's statement is based upon figures published
by the Federal Children's Bureau.
117. Clarke, Social Legislation (1940) 308; Baylor & Monachesi, The
Rehabilitation of Children (1939) 29.
118. Brooks, Adventuring in Adoption (1939) 132.
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attitude that adoption effects a complete substitution of families.
This requires the embodiment in statute form of the following
scheme of intestate succession by and from the adopted child:
The adopted child and the adoptive parents and their lineal
and collateral relatives should inherit from and through each
other to the same extent and in the same manner as though the
child were the natural child of the adoptor, and all intestate suc-
cession rights between the adopted child and the natural rela-
tives and kin should be completely severed. 119
APPENDIX
Statutory Provisions Governing Intestate Succession by and from the
Adopted Child
Ala. Code (1940) tit. 27 §§5, 9.
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §§39-103, 27-208.
Ark. Stat. (Pope's Cum. Supp. 1942) §262.
Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1941) §257.
Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 4 §5.
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1935 Supp.) p. 689.
Del. Laws of 1937, c. 187, p. 622.
D. C. Code (1941) §16-205.
Fla. Stat. (1941) §731.80.
Ga. Laws of 1941, c. 74-4.
Idaho Code (1932) §§31-1108, 31-1109.
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1941) c. 3 §165; c. 4 §§8, 11.
Ind. Acts of 1941, c. 146 §§7, 8.
Iowa Code (1938) §§10501.6, 12017, 12027, 12028.
Kans. Gen. Stat. (1989 Supp.) §§59-507, 59-2103.
Ky. Rev. Stat. (Baldwin's, 1941) §§891.080, 405.200.
La. Gen. Stat. (Dart, 1939) §§4889.31, 9734.6.
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 80 §38.
Md. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 16 §81.
Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 210 §7.
Mich. Comp. Laws (1940 Supp.) §§16289-2 (86), 16289-10 (5).
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §8630.
Miss. Code (1930) §358.
Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) §9614.
Mont. Rev. Code (1935) §§5863-5864.
Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) §43-109.
Nev. Comp. Laws (1931-1941 Supp.) §1065.04.
N. H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 345 §5.
119. Express provision should, however, be made for three types of
factual situations which are somewhat out of the ordinary: (1) When
the child is adopted by a natural relative, he should be recognized for in-
heritance purposes only in the capacity as an adopted child and intestate
succession by and from the child should proceed as though the child had
been born to the adoptor. (2) When the adoptor is a stepparent, inheri-
tance between the child and his adoptive relatives should be determined
by the general rule outlined in the text, but the intestacy rights between
the child and the natural family should not be severed. (3) When a child
once adopted is adopted a second time, all inheritance rights between the
child and the first adoptive family should be terminated as of the date of
the second adoption.
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N. J. Stat. Ann. (1939) §9: 3-9.
N. Mex. Stat. (1929) c. 2 §113.
N. Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney) Dom. Rela. Law §115.
N. Car. Code (1939) §§137(6), 191(6).
N. Dak. Comp. Laws (1913) §4448.
Ohio Code Ann. (1940) §10512-19.
Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 10 §§52, 53, 56.
Ore. Comp. Laws (1940) §§63-407, 63-408.
Pa. Stat. (1936) tit. 20 §§101, 102; Laws of 1941, p. 424.
R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 420 §§6, 7.
S. Car. Code of Laws (1942) §8679.
S. Dak. Code (1939) §14.0407.
Tenn. Code (1938) §9570.
Tex. Stat. Ann. (Vernon's Civil) arts. 46a (sec. 9), 2572.
Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) §§14-4-11, 14-4-12.
Vt. Laws of 1941, p. 61.
Va. Acts of 1940, p. 424.
Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932) §1699.
W. Va. Acts of 1941, c. 27 §8.
Wis. Stat. (1939) §322.07.
Wyo. Rev. Stat. (1931) c. 20 §215.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss4/2
